ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
imilar to loan sales and securitizations, the use of credit derivatives has allowed commercial banks to separate the origination of loans from the credit risk exposure associated with the funding and holding of loans. In contrast to interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange derivatives, credit derivatives 1 are traded by a relatively small number of large commercial banks, other financial institutions, non-financial corporations and hedge funds (Brandon and Fernandez, 2005) . Research regarding banks' use of credit derivatives and its consequences has begun, but we are aware of no published work that examines the reasons why some commercial banks are net credit protection buyers while others are net credit protection sellers. 2 Demsetz (2000) documents that banks specializing in loan sales tend to have a comparative advantage in loan originations, while banks specializing in loan purchases tend to have a comparative advantage in funding loans. Banks are better able to engage in frequent loan originations when they keep moving credit risks off their books. Thus, the loan originators are expected to be more heavily involved not only in loan sales, but also in securitizations and the purchase of credit protection. In contrast, banks that are better at funding loans would be expected to buy loans and assume credit risks that others wish to shed by selling credit protection.
We are unable to compare loan origination amounts or frequencies across banks to verify that net credit protection buyers specialize in loan originations while net credit protection sellers specialize in loan funding. However, we can identify some characteristics that give banks a competitive edge when negotiating loan terms and, thus, make them more likely to specialize in loan originations.
First, a bank is able to negotiate better loan terms during the loan origination process when it has access to inside information about the borrower. Acharya and Johnson (2007) find evidence of insider trading in the market for credit derivatives, which suggests that market makers in credit derivatives have access to more private information about a given borrower than non-market-makers or non-users. The incremental private information available to market makers in credit derivatives likely influences the loan terms negotiated by these banks and makes them more competitive. 3 Furthermore, market makers may specialize in loan originations and loan sales, because they are better connected in the financial community and can find buyers for their loans more easily than non-market-makers. We define market makers as those banks that have the largest total notional amounts of credit derivatives (amounts where bank is guarantor plus amounts where bank is beneficiary) per dollar of assets.
Second, a bank with a reputation for high-quality lending is likely able to originate loans with very highquality borrowers due to superior screening and monitoring technologies that allow the bank to offer lower rates or more attractive loan terms than competing lenders (Ross, 2006) . Highly reputable banks may also be able to charge certification premiums as part of the loan rates they offer when they lend to lesser known, high-quality borrowers (Cook et al., 2003) and thus have a comparative advantage in loan originations for that reason. We use ratings from Highline Data's Bank Rating Report as proxies for bank reputation to test if net protection buyers tend to have higher bank ratings.
Consistent with the results of Demsetz (2000), we suggest that net buyers of credit protection similar to loan sellers, are better able to negotiate loan terms and originate loans. We test two independent, not necessarily mutually exclusive, hypotheses. The market maker hypothesis suggests that net buyers of credit protection are market makers in credit derivatives and have greater total notional amounts of credit derivatives per dollar of assets than net sellers of credit protection. The reputable lender hypothesis suggests that net buyers of credit protection have better reputations (higher ratings) than net sellers of credit protection.
To test these two hypotheses, we segregate the group of net buyers into those that only buy credit protection (referred to as "only buyers") and those that buy and sell but take net buy positions (referred to as "sellbuyers"). The sum of "sell-buyers" and "only buyers" is referred to as "net buyers." Similarly, we segregate the group of net sellers into those that only sell credit protection (referred to as "only sellers") and those that buy and sell but take net sell positions (referred to as "buy-sellers"). The sum of "buy-sellers" and "only sellers" is referred to as "net sellers." We also rank the bank observations by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets and identify observations in the top, middle and bottom thirds. Thus, we are able to compare only buyers and sellbuyers in the top third of bank observations with only sellers and buy-sellers in the bottom third of bank observations.
Our empirical results are consistent with the notion that net credit protection buyers may be better at originating and selling loans, while net credit protection sellers may have a comparative advantage in funding and buying loans. We provide support for both the market maker hypothesis and the reputable lender hypothesis. Only buyers in the top third of net credit protection buyers seem to have higher quality ratings than any of the other credit derivative users, even though their asset size is relatively small and they are not among the top market makers in credit derivatives. Sell-buyers in the top third of net credit protection buyers have the largest mean asset size and appear to be market makers in credit derivatives. Their quality ratings are surprisingly low, perhaps because their status as market makers allows them to specialize in loan originations in spite of their relatively poor lender reputations.
The following section describes our data and sample selection. In section 3, we discuss the empirical tests and results. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
SAMPLE AND DATA
Our sample of banks is obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) database for the years 2002-2005. We exclude banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. The remaining sample includes 2891 end-of-year observations of banks engaged in derivative activities as reported in Table 1 . Of these, there are 83 observations of net credit protection buyers, 48 observations of net credit protection sellers and 2,760 observations of non-users, i.e. banks that use in a given year interest rate and/or foreign exchange derivatives, but not credit derivatives. Of the net buyer observations, there are 45 only buyer observations and 38 sell-buyer (those that buy and sell credit protection but take net buy positions) observations. Of the net seller observations, there are 20 only seller observations and 28 buy-seller (those that buy and sell credit protection but take net sell positions) observations. 
3.
Empirical results
Loan origination versus loan funding
We first compare selected characteristics of net credit protection buyers with those of net credit protection sellers. We find support for the notion that net credit protection buyers tend to specialize in loan sales and securitizations and may have a comparative advantage in loan originations. Net credit protection sellers appear to be more likely to buy and fund loans. Tables 3 and 4 show that net credit protection buyers tend to be larger than net credit protection sellers with both lower gross loans-to-assets and deposits-to-assets ratios. Both the means and medians of these variables are significantly different in both tables, except for the medians of the gross loans-to-assets ratio in Table 3 . There are no significant differences in the proportion of foreign loans (non-US loans/gross loans) held by the two groups. Net buyers may be slightly more diversified across different loan categories than net sellers, but it is only the difference between medians in Table 4 that is statistically significant. Net buyers are more profitable than net sellers with significantly higher means and medians for the return-on-assets and the return-on-equity measures reported in both Tables 3 and 4 . These tables also show that net buyers derive greater proportions of their revenues from non-interest income sources. This result is consistent with the notion that net buyers of credit protection tend to specialize in loan originations, loan sales, securitizations and other off-balance sheet activities. Consistent with greater profitability, net buyers are less levered, with higher equity to asset ratios than net sellers, although the differences between the medians of capital ratios are not all statistically significant. Top buyers of credit protection have a significantly higher proportion of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans sold and a higher proportion of loans held for sale than top sellers (see Table 4 ). C&I loan securitizations are also higher but not statistically significant. Finally, the group of top buyers appears to include market makers in all types of derivative contracts (interest rates, foreign exchange and credit derivatives). 
Market Makers Versus Reputable Lenders
Given that net credit protection buyers are larger, have lower loans-to-assets ratios, greater proportions of non-interest revenue, higher profitability, higher capital ratios and greater proportions of loan sales than net sellers, we further test the notion that net credit protection buyers may have a comparative advantage in loan originations. To that end, we examine whether the group of net buyers is homogeneous or whether we can identify sub-samples within this group. Table 5 sheds light on differences between only buyers and sell-buyers of credit protection. Sell-buyers are significantly larger than only buyers and more diversified across different loan categories. While both sub-groups have similar deposits-to-assets ratios, only buyers have significantly lower loans-to-asset ratios. The proportion of non-US loans is greater for sell-buyers, but only the difference in medians is statistically significant. Only buyers appear to derive a higher proportion of their revenues from non-interest sources, but the differences in means and medians are not statistically significant. Returns on assets and equity are not significantly different. Interestingly, only buyers have significantly higher capital ratios suggesting that only buyers may be higher quality lenders than sell-buyers. However, there is no clear difference between the two groups in C&I loan securitizations, the proportion of C&I loans sold or the proportion of loans held for sale. Finally, there is a substantial difference in the extent to which the two sub-groups are involved in derivatives activities. Sell-buyers appear to be market makers in interest rate, foreign exchange and credit derivative contracts, while only buyers' involvement is significantly weaker in all three derivative markets. Suspecting that the sources of net buyers' competitive advantage as loan originators may be different for the only buyers versus the sell-buyers, we report in Table 6 the Highline Data's bank quality ratings 4 and the extent of banks' involvement in credit derivatives for different sub-groups of our sample. Table 6 shows that sell-buyers in the top third of bank observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets are, by far, the largest banks in our sample. However, their mean quality ratings are just barely above those of the only sellers, which are the lowest among all sub-group mean ratings. Yet, the top sell-buyers have the highest mean ratios of total notional amount of credit derivatives per dollar of assets and per dollar of loans. This group appears to represent the market makers in the credit derivatives market.
Only buyers in the top third of bank observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets are much smaller, on average, than sell-buyers and buy-sellers. Yet, they have the highest mean quality ratings in the sample. While they cannot be considered market makers in credit derivatives, only buyers stand out as highquality lenders, a status that undoubtedly enables them to attract high-quality borrowers and, most likely, facilitates the setting of competitive lending terms.
Regression Results
To support our previous results, we regress net credit protection purchased against proxies for market maker status, lender reputation, and loan sales. We also include the Loan Herfindahl Index as a measure of diversification across different loan categories to control for the return variability of a bank's loan portfolio. The regression model is as follows:
The dependent variable is net credit protection bought per dollar of assets (NETBUY). The first independent variable is our proxy for market maker status, DNOTITOP, which is a dummy taking the value of one when bank observations are in the top 20 percent of observations ranked by the total notional amount of credit derivatives per dollar of assets, and zero otherwise. To identify the highest-quality lender reputations, we use the second dummy variable, DRANKTOP, which equals one when bank observations are in the top 20 percent of observations ranked by Highline Data's National Ranking. Our proxy for loan sales is the variable, LOANSALE, which is defined as loans held for sale divided by gross loans. Finally, HLOAN is the Loan Herfindahl Index. The regression results are presented in Table 7 . As expected, all four explanatory variables are positive and significant. DNOTITOP, DRANKTOP and HLOAN are significant at the 1 percent level while the variable LOANSALE is significant at the 10 percent level. The adjusted R 2 equals .330. These results are consistent with a positive relationship between loan sales and net purchases of credit protection for credit derivative users, with higher intercepts for both high-quality lenders and market makers, two sub-samples of banks which likely act as loan originators. Market makers appear to have a higher intercept than high-quality lenders which, in turn, have a higher intercept than all other users of credit derivatives. In other words, market makers appear to buy the most net credit protection per dollar of assets, even among the group of banks that likely specializes in loan originations. A possible explanation may be that the market makers, which consist mostly of large, well-diversified top sell-buyers, take on higher financial and credit risks than the smaller, less diversified high-quality lenders, which consist mostly of top only buyers. 5 Controlling for other financial and credit risks with the rating dummy, DRANKTOP, our regression results suggest that greater diversification reduces the need for credit protection. In summary, our results support the notion that the greatest net buyers of credit protection tend to be market makers in credit derivatives, or banks with reputations as high-quality lenders, that are likely to specialize in loan originations and loan sales. The net sellers of credit protection tend to be smaller, or lack high-quality reputations. These banks are more likely to buy and fund loans originated by others.
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We investigate why some banks are net buyers of credit protection while others are net sellers of credit protection. Using a sample of 131 bank observations involving the use of credit derivatives over the 2002-2005 time period, we find support for the notion that net credit protection buyers are more heavily involved in loan sales and may specialize in loan originations, while net credit protection sellers are more likely to buy and fund loans.
Our results further suggest that only buyers and sell-buyers (those that buy and sell but take net buy positions) of credit protection in the top third of observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets and may derive a competitive advantage as loan originators from different sources. Only buyers may be better able to attract high-quality borrowers on more favorable lending terms than their peers due to a superior reputation for high-quality lending. Sell-buyers may be better negotiators of lending terms due to the fact that, as market makers in credit derivatives, they enjoy access to inside information that is unavailable to their peers. Furthermore, these banks are likely to be better connected in the financial community and, thus, have an advantage in placing loans with third parties.
To further test whether banks specialize in different lending functions (e.g. loan originations versus loan funding) and whether this specialization is reflected in different credit derivative usage patterns, it would be useful to establish links between the lending terms a bank negotiates and its use of credit derivatives. Further research is also needed to establish whether banks that specialize in different lending functions are different with respect to their exposures to risk. And finally, one might investigate how and why a given bank's credit derivative usage pattern and functional specialization change over time.
NOTES
1 Credit derivatives are off-balance sheet arrangements allowing the credit risk of an asset to be transferred from one party (the beneficiary or buyer of credit protection) to another (the guarantor or seller of credit protection) with payoffs depending on the occurrence of a credit event, such as failure to pay or restructuring. The two main types of credit derivatives are credit default swaps (CDS) and synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). See Neftci (2004) for definitions of these financial products. 2 A related paper by Minton et al. (2008) analyzes the characteristics of net credit protection buyers and finds that they typically are heavily involved in commercial and industrial (C&I) lending and tend to use other methods of transferring credit risk, such as asset securitization. Hirtle (2007) reports that banks' ability to purchase credit protection has increased the credit supply particularly to large term borrowers. While the scope of our research is different, our results are consistent with those reported by these two studies.
